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Reserve recomputation report, published July 7, 2026

We recomputed the reserves. Here is what reconciles.

We took the 27 stablecoins and synthetic dollars we cover, read every one of their 32 on-chain deployments across Base and Ethereum ourselves, and mapped where the reserves you can check end and the reserves you have to trust begin. The finding is simple and a little uncomfortable: on-chain supply always reconciles, because anyone can call it. Reserves mostly do not, because most backing lives off-chain, where you read an attestation instead of the accounts. Only 8 of the 27 let you read the reserve leg with no attestor at all. This is Kerne, kerne.fi, the Base delta-neutral synthetic dollar, and the report names our own limits on the same page.

The finding, in one paragraph.

Every stablecoin tells you it is fully backed. We wanted to know how much of that you can actually check before you trust it. So we recomputed the one number that is never a matter of trust, the live on-chain supply, for all 27 dollars, and then we did the harder thing: we located, for each one, exactly where its reserve figure comes from. What we found is a field that splits three ways. 8 dollars let you read the reserve backing on-chain yourself, with no third party in the path. 9 are mixed, part readable and part resting on an off-chain layer you take on an attestation. And 10 route the authoritative reserve figure through a third-party attestor you read and trust. None of those is wrong, and a reputable attestation is a legitimate, often excellent model. The point of this report is only to be precise about which is which, and to show our work.

One more finding sits underneath all of it, and it is the one worth carrying away: a reserve you can read on-chain is not automatically a reserve that is holding. 3 of the 27 dollars were not operating normally when we read them, and at least one of them has fully on-chain, attestor-free, and readable reserves that were, at the same moment, about 86 percent below a dollar. Verifiable and sound are different properties. This report measures the first with care and never pretends to have measured the second.

By the numbers.

Every figure below is computed from the same registry that drives the 27 per-token pages this report links, so the report can never quietly disagree with the pages underneath it. Categories describe the structure of the verification, not the quality of any protocol.

27
dollars recomputed, one page each
32
on-chain deployments read across 2 chains
8
let you read the reserve leg with no attestor
9
mixed: part on-chain, part attested
10
route the reserve figure through an attestor
19
carry a named third-party attestor
3
flagged: not operating normally when read
2
re-derive a signed reserve proof (Kerne only)

The 8, 9 and 10 split partitions the whole field: every dollar lands in exactly one of the three. Of the 8 attestor-optional dollars, most are crypto-collateralized designs whose collateral sits in readable contracts; only Kerne's 2 tokens also publish a proof of the reserve you can re-derive from public inputs, which is a stricter test than readable. 9 of the 27 are delta-neutral designs that disclose an off-chain hedge leg, and not one of them, Kerne included, lets you recompute that leg in real time.

How we recomputed it.

The method is deliberately dull, because dull is reproducible. For each token we did the same four things, and you can redo every one of them yourself.

  1. Read the supply from the chain. We called totalSupply(), symbol() and decimals() on each deployment directly from a public RPC endpoint at a block. Every per-token page carries the exact cast and curl commands to reproduce the read, so the one number this report never asks you to trust is the number you can most easily check.
  2. Confirmed identity by address, not name. A look-alike token can copy any symbol, so an enrichment is applied only when the live on-chain symbol matches the registry entry. A stale or wrong address fails safe to a generic read rather than mislabeling a token.
  3. Located the reserve figure. We read each issuer's own disclosures, dashboards and attestation letters, cross-referenced them against independent trackers, and classified the reserve leg on one structural axis: is a third-party attestor optional, because you can read the backing on-chain, or required, because the accounts are off-chain and you read a figure someone publishes?
  4. Dated everything, and marked what we could not reach. Every current-state fact is dated (reviewed July 3, 2026); the structural method is evergreen, the snapshot ages. Where a reserve is off-chain, an RWA par value rests on a fund administrator, or a hedge sits on an exchange, we say so plainly rather than counting it as verified.

This is attestation and objective-data tooling, not an audit, a rating, or a solvency opinion. It recomputes what is public and on-chain and is explicit about the parts it cannot recompute. Run the same read on any token in the free Verify Any Stablecoin tool, or open any row in the field below.

What reconciled.

The good news first, because there is real, checkable transparency in this field and it deserves to be named as precisely as the gaps.

  • On-chain supply, every single time. For all 27 dollars, the supply read straight from the chain and matched what a block explorer shows. This is the floor of verifiability, and every token in this report clears it. It is also the least of what backing transparency requires, which is the rest of this page.
  • The crypto-collateralized dollars whose backing is fully on-chain. For designs such as LUSD, crvUSD and GHO, the entire backing is collateral held in readable contracts, with no off-chain reserve and no attestor. You can read all of it. The residual risk there is smart-contract and collateral-price risk, not attestor trust, and we say so on each page.
  • Where a live read matched the issuer's own disclosure. For Falcon's USDf, our on-chain supply read lined up with the figure on Falcon's dashboard and its weekly HT Digital attestation letter. That is a genuine reconciliation of the on-chain leg. The honest caveat, carried into the next section, is that only about 1.3 percent of USDf's reserves are on-chain by Falcon's own API; the rest is an attestation you read.
  • Kerne's own reserve, re-derived, not asserted. kUSD mints one for one from USDC through an on-chain module on Base, so its reserve is readable off the chain directly, and its hourly Proof of Reserves is signed from public inputs you can rehash yourself. That is the one place in this whole field where the reserve figure is reproducible rather than published. It is also, deliberately, only the reserve leg.

What did not reconcile, and what a readable reserve still cannot tell you.

These are findings, stated as our recomputation shows them, sourced and dated, and hedged where the number is issuer-published rather than re-derivable. None of this is an accusation. Several of these protocols are large, audited and well run; the gaps below are structural facts about where verification ends.

  • MIM: readable reserves that did not hold the peg. Magic Internet Money is backed by collateral in readable on-chain cauldron contracts with no third-party attestor, and it still traded near $0.14 on July 3, 2026, about 86 percent below a dollar, after a June 2026 depeg on thin, one-sided liquidity. This is the report's central lesson in one token: on-chain-readable is not the same as sound. Read the full record on the MIM page.
  • deUSD: sunset to no value. Elixir wound down deUSD in November 2025 after Stream Finance, which had been lent a majority of the collateral through a private arrangement, disclosed a large loss and halted withdrawals. Elixir's own docs now state deUSD holds no value and warn against buying it. The tokens still exist on-chain; the backing does not. See the deUSD page.
  • USR: paused, in recovery. Resolv's USR has been paused since a compromised signing key minted about 80 million unbacked USR in March 2026; it is in a recovery process through August 2026 that treats pre-incident holders as senior creditors. We read it as a post-incident record, not a live comparison. See the USR page.
  • The issuer figure you read is not always the figure you can re-derive. Falcon's June 2026 recap headlined a 103.32 percent backing ratio while its own live API computed 102.59 percent on July 1, 2026. Both are issuer-published numbers you read, not numbers you reproduce, and roughly 99 percent of the reserve is visible only through attestation. That is the normal shape of a custodied design, and it is exactly the leg this report cannot recompute for you.
  • A price below a dollar is not always a depeg. apxUSD is a net-asset-value tracker by design, not a fixed $1 peg, so its sub-dollar price mirrors below-par collateral rather than a broken promise. USDz has traded persistently below $1 on thin liquidity with a large supply contraction. Neutrl's NUSD supply fell about two-thirds from its February 2026 peak with the peg holding near $1 throughout, an outflow, not a depeg. We flag each precisely, because the difference matters and a report that blurred it would be the thing it warns against.

Where our recomputation stops.

A findings report that hid its own blind spots would be worthless. So here, plainly, is everything this recomputation does not reach, ours included. These are not failures of the protocols; they are the honest edge of what anyone can verify from public inputs today.

  • Off-chain custodied reserves. For the 10 attestor-required dollars, and the off-chain portion of the 9 mixed ones, the reserves sit with custodians and on exchanges. We recompute the supply; the reserve figure reaches us as an attestation we read, from real firms of genuine standing. We did not, and cannot, re-derive those accounts.
  • Real-world-asset par values. For tokenized T-bill and private-credit designs, the on-chain token is readable but its par value rests on an off-chain fund administrator's attestation. We confirm the on-chain mirror; we take the underlying par value on the administrator's word, as every holder does.
  • Every delta-neutral hedge leg, including ours. All 9 delta-neutral dollars here hedge with a short position that lives off-chain, and that leg reaches a holder as a reported or attested figure, never as data you re-derive. Kerne is not ahead here. Our short runs on Hyperliquid, a single venue, self-reported and bound to a signature rather than independently attested, which is more concentrated than the larger names, not less. An independent attestation of that leg is being scoped and is not yet live.
  • Kerne's other limits. Kerne is pre-audit and Genesis scale, deliberately small; its published skUSD yield is a live model, not a large realized distribution; and its module prices USDC at a hard 1:1 with no depeg oracle on that leg. Every one of these is listed at /legible and in the scorecard. We win one leg by construction and tie the field on the other, and both are in this report on purpose.

The full field, 27 dollars.

Every dollar we recomputed, ordered from the ones you can check yourself to the ones you read an attestation for. Open any row for its live on-chain supply, the exact commands to reproduce it, and the sourced breakdown of where its trust boundary sits. A flag marks a token that was not operating normally when we read it.

DollarIssuerCategoryChainsReserve legVerify
crvUSDCurve USDCurve FinanceCrypto-collateralizedEthereumAttestor-optionalOn-chain collateralVerify crvUSD
DAIDai StablecoinSky (formerly MakerDAO)Crypto-collateralizedEthereumAttestor-optionalOn-chain collateralVerify DAI
GHOAave GHOAaveCrypto-collateralizedEthereumAttestor-optionalOn-chain collateralVerify GHO
LUSDLiquity USDLiquityCrypto-collateralizedEthereumAttestor-optionalOn-chain collateralVerify LUSD
MIMflaggedMagic Internet MoneyAbracadabra.moneyCrypto-collateralizedEthereumAttestor-optionalOn-chain collateralVerify MIM
sDAISavings DaiSky (formerly MakerDAO)Crypto-collateralizedEthereumAttestor-optionalOn-chain collateralVerify sDAI
kUSDKerne USDKerne Protocol (this site)Synthetic delta-neutralBaseAttestor-optionalSelf-verifiableVerify kUSD
skUSDStaked Kerne USDKerne Protocol (this site)Synthetic delta-neutralBaseAttestor-optionalSelf-verifiableVerify skUSD
cUSDcap USDCap LabsCrypto-collateralizedEthereumPartly attestor-requiredPartly on-chainVerify cUSD
FRAXFraxFrax FinanceCrypto-collateralizedEthereumPartly attestor-requiredPartly on-chainVerify FRAX
apxUSDapxUSDApyxRWA-backedEthereum, BasePartly attestor-requiredPartly on-chainVerify apxUSD
USD0Usual USD0UsualRWA-backedEthereumPartly attestor-requiredPartly on-chainVerify USD0
USDzAnzen USDzAnzen FinanceRWA-backedBase, EthereumPartly attestor-requiredPartly on-chainVerify USDz
deUSDflaggedElixir deUSDElixirSynthetic delta-neutralEthereumPartly attestor-requiredPartly on-chainVerify deUSD
sUSDeStaked Ethena USDeEthena LabsSynthetic delta-neutralEthereumPartly attestor-requiredPartly on-chainVerify sUSDe
USDeEthena USDeEthena LabsSynthetic delta-neutralEthereumPartly attestor-requiredPartly on-chainVerify USDe
USRflaggedResolv USDResolvSynthetic delta-neutralEthereum, BasePartly attestor-requiredPartly on-chainVerify USR
FDUSDFirst Digital USDFirst DigitalFiat-backedEthereumAttestor-requiredTrust an attestorVerify FDUSD
PYUSDPayPal USDPaxos (for PayPal)Fiat-backedEthereumAttestor-requiredTrust an attestorVerify PYUSD
TUSDTrueUSDTrueUSDFiat-backedEthereumAttestor-requiredTrust an attestorVerify TUSD
USDCUSD CoinCircleFiat-backedBase, EthereumAttestor-requiredTrust an attestorVerify USDC
USDPPax DollarPaxosFiat-backedEthereumAttestor-requiredTrust an attestorVerify USDP
USDTTether USDTetherFiat-backedEthereumAttestor-requiredTrust an attestorVerify USDT
mTBILLMidas US Treasury Bill TokenMidasRWA-backedEthereum, BaseAttestor-requiredTrust an attestorVerify mTBILL
NUSDNeutrl USDNeutrlSynthetic delta-neutralEthereumAttestor-requiredTrust an attestorVerify NUSD
USDfFalcon USDFalcon FinanceSynthetic delta-neutralEthereumAttestor-requiredTrust an attestorVerify USDf
USNNoon USNNoon CapitalSynthetic delta-neutralEthereumAttestor-requiredTrust an attestorVerify USN

"Attestor-optional" means the reserve backing is readable on-chain, so a third-party attestor is optional on that leg; "partly attestor-required" means part is readable and part rests on an off-chain layer; "attestor-required" means the reserve sits off-chain and you read an attestation of it. These describe the structure of the verification, never the quality of the issuer. See the same field ranked on the reserve transparency scorecard or placed on the five-model attestation versus recomputation spectrum.

From a free read to a signed one

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Everything in this report is free to reproduce, and you should not take our word for any of it. Paste any address into the free tool, open a per-token page for the reproduce-yourself commands, or, when you need a record rather than a link, buy a signed one. The paid tiers sign public on-chain bytes at a point in time; they are attestation and objective-data tooling, not an audit or a solvency opinion.

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Sources and related reading.

Every token's current-state facts are drawn from its issuer's own disclosures and the named attestor, cross-referenced against independent trackers and a direct on-chain read, and dated on each per-token page (registry reviewed July 3, 2026). The structural method is evergreen; each protocol's current state ages, so verify at the canonical sources linked from each page.

Go deeper: the synthetic-dollar reserve transparency scorecard ranks the field on one axis; the attestation versus recomputation page places five trust models on a spectrum; /legible is the failure ledger of the dollars that collapsed; the essay who actually verifies the synthetic dollars is the long-form version; and /verify recomputes Kerne's own signed proof in your browser.

Published July 7, 2026. Data reviewed July 3, 2026. Kerne is infrastructure and a service provider, not an auditor, a rating agency, a custodian, or an investment adviser. This report reads public on-chain data and names publicly disclosed transparency methods; it is not an audit, a solvency or credit opinion, a recommendation, or any form of investment, legal, tax, or accounting advice, and the appearance of any token is not an endorsement or a claim that it is under-backed or non-compliant. Kerne is not affiliated with any issuer or attestor named here. Nothing here is financial advice.